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has several distinct obligations to the
plaintiff. The moral virtue of justice obliges the lawyer to make
restitution for the harm which the laborer has already sustained, and
also to prevent further harm coming to the laborer as a consequence of
the lawyer's wrongful conduct. The lawyer is obliged by charity to help
the laborer in his financial and physical necessities.
HE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

The Lawyer Unjustly Harmed the Laborer
From the terms of the problem statement, two factual conclusions
appear. The attorney wilfully made a false representation with intent that
the laborer should rely upon it, and the laborer, relying upon this misrepresentation, deprived himself without compensation of any practical
opportunity to recover on a good cause of action. In consequence of the
same misrepresentation and reliance, the laborer is exposed to serious
peril of having to endure a long period of suffering and disability.
The falsity of the lawyer's representation follows, not from any passive concealment, but from an active concealment which is equivalent to
a positive statement that the fact concealed does not exist. The lawyer
caused the laborer to view the physical examination made by the two
doctors as a single transaction, undertaken to test the accuracy of the
hospital record on the nature of the laborer's injuries. The nature of his
injuries was the basic factor in the transaction of release and satisfaction
which the parties then contemplated. The lawyer concealed not only the
contents of the neurologist's report but even its existence and he did this
deliberately and with the purpose of preventing the plaintiff from knowing that he was afflicted with Parkinson's disease. To advance this pur-

* This article is reprinted from 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 254 (Summer, 1958).
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pose, the lawyer offered freely to the plaintiff's attorneys and to the court the report
of the orthopedist, which referred to the
shoulder injury only and which, when thus
presented alone, seemed to confirm fully
the accuracy of the hospital record.
If x stands for the plaintiff's condition, a
for shoulder injuries and b for brain pathology, the true fact is reflected by the
formula x = a - b. The lawyer, purporting
to describe x, in effect declared "x =a."
Therefore, the lawyer lied wilfully to the
laborer, intending that the laborer should
be lead thereby to accept a release which,
in spite of its general terms, was not intended to be a surrender of any rights in
respect of injuries actively concealed from
him by his adversary's agent. This release,
if the manner of its procurement were
known, would be held no bar at law to an
action predicated upon the injuries thus
actively concealed. But it will serve, as the
lawyer intended it should serve, to make
the plaintiff and his attorneys believe that
the laborer has no cause of action against
the defendant, and to create a bar in fact
to the commencement of any action.
Is the claim of the plaintiff in respect of
his Parkinsonism so unsubstantial or frivolous that one can say he has suffered no
real harm by its loss? It has been so often
decided as to be a truism that a plaintiff
states a sufficient cause of action when he
asserts a physical ill which reasonably may
be related causally to an impact for which
the defendant is legally responsible. With
so much, the plaintiff has a clear right to
go to the trier of the facts with honest
proof of the causality he asserts.' His right

1 Cf. Cahill, NaturalLaw Jurisprudencein Legal
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to come into court is not extinguished,
either legally or morally, because the defendant has honest and competent proofs
which deny causation in the premises, nor
even because it seems probable that the
defendant will succeed but only at great
cost. The medical literature we have seen
suggests that if trauma causes Parkinsonism, it does so infrequently and that, especially when the first symptoms are discovered in a patient over fifty, the disease
is referred only with considerable difficulty
to trauma as a cause, or even as a precipitating factor. Yet the laborer has a legal
and a moral right to present to the trier
of facts evidence, if it is competent and
honest, that his affliction had its origin in,
or was at least precipitated by, his fall upon
the defendant's step. The medical writers
clearly admit the possibility of establishing
such conclusions.
The Lawyer's Duty of Restitution
What has been said indicates that the
lawyer's conduct meets all three of the
moralists' tests for establishing a duty to
make restitution for damages. 2 The lawyer
acted with theological fault, for he acted
freely and with realization that he was doing a morally evil thing, violative of the
laborer's strict right, and effective to cause
real damage to the laborer. The lawyer's
act was, in objective fact, violative of the
plaintiff's right not to be deprived of a
cause of action by deceit-every man has
the moral right not to be ousted or barred
from enjoyment of a right of property by

Practice, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 23, 34-35 (Winter
1958).
2 Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality,
4 CATIOLic LAWYER 41, 55 (Winter 1958).
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means of a lie. Finally, there is no doubt
that the lawyer's conduct was, in the objective order, efficacious to deprive the
plaintiff of his right without compensation.
It would be possible to deny the lawyer's
fault if we supposed he did not understand
that sound morality is reflected in the trite
doctrine of the law that deceit is no less
malicious when done by active concealment than when accomplished by verbal
statements which are contrary to the speaker's knowledge. Or the lawyer might be said
not to have incurred the duty of restitution
if he did not understand that the plaintiff
had a strict moral right not to be deprived
in fact of his legal right to sue. There may
be some men who have come to believe
that the use of any means, not described
with explicit detail in a criminal statute or
in an opinion ordering disbarment, is justified if it is dedicated to the purpose of
success-the success of a client, of course.
Since this lawyer has manifested some
qualms of conscience, he cannot be one of
these. To suppose that the lawyer did not
act here with foresight that his action was
capable and calculated to produce the effect he intended it to have would be absurd.
In order to incur the duty of restitution
for damage, the person who has culpably
and effectively inflicted unjust damage need
not have had a subjective realization that
the duty to restore would be a necessary
moral consequence of his conduct. It appears that the defendant's attorney has been
ignorant that his conduct imposed upon
him the duty to make the plaintiff whole,
and that only after a month had passed
from the time the release was fraudulently
procured did he begin to doubt whether he
was now under some obligation to help the

laborer. Clearly, he has not increased his
primary guilt by failing to perform, during
the period of his ignorance, the duty of
restitution. He has, by making inquiry as
to his present duties, fulfilled the basic
moral obligation not to continue a line of
conduct or of inaction when one doubts
its moral righteousness, without using all
means reasonably available to resolve such
doubt. But the theological fault which is a
premise to the duty of restitution for damage requires that there be, at the moment
when the wrongful act is done or when its
effective production of harm is wilfully permitted to continue, actual advertence to
three objects only: the immorality of the
act, its character as a violation of the strict
right of another person, and its probable
capacity to harm that person. For such
theological fault to be incurred, it is not
required that the duty of restitution shall
have been realized subjectively at the time
the fault was committed or when its harmful efficacy was wilfully permitted to continue.

The Lawyer's Duty to Save
the Laborer from Increased
Suffering and Disability
It seems clear that the lawyer alone has
in his hands the means of saving the laborer
from a very considerable additional period
of great suffering and serious disability.
While the defendant and the neurologist
may know the facts which indicate the laborer's present perilous situation and its
remedy, the lawyer appears to be the only
person who, in addition to knowing the
facts, understands adequately the danger
which now impends for the laborer be-
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cause the laborer has been deceived with
respect to them.
The laborer's peril arises out of two
interrelated sets of circumstances. The
medical circumstances are set out in the
statement: If the laborer does not have
treatment of his disease in its early stages,
the degree and the duration of the pain,
suffering, and disability which characterize
the advanced stages of Parkinson's disease
will be very much aggravated. Clearly the
laborer will not get early treatment unless
he comes to realize his affliction. The circumstances flowing from the lawyer's deceit
very seriously diminish the likelihood that
the laborer will come to this realization
in time to get treatment early enough
effectively to postpone and ameliorate the
disease's advanced stages. The man's conduct, as described in the statement, indicates that he is inclined not to consult
physicians except when he is suffering from
an acute complaint and believes that the
doctors have or can find a remedy; he
sought treatment once, at the hospital, in
such circumstances. Later, he had headaches, and he might have been led by this
fact to have an examination which would
uncover the Parkinsonism. But the lawyer
has made him believe that competent medical men explored that symptom without
being able to suggest its cause or cure. The
early symptoms of paralysis agitans may be
attributed readily, by a patient of this
man's age, culture and experience, to approaching senility. It is quite likely that the
lawyer's deceit in respect of the headaches
will lead the laborer to assume an attitude
of hopeless endurance toward the early
symptoms of shaking and stiffness.
The lawyer's moral responsibility for the
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harm here threatening the laborer differs
from his conscientious accountability for
the laborer's loss of his cause of action. No
harm in respect of pain, suffering or disability seems to have been actually inflicted
up to this time. If the lawyer had disclosed
the neurologist's report, the patient could
have had for his headaches no treatment
more effective than common headache
remedies. A delay of one month in commencing treatment for Parkinsonism seems
not to have any real significance in the
prognosis for the advanced development of
that disease. Therefore, we cannot say the
lawyer has a duty to repair or compensate
for any harm already inflicted upon the
laborer's health.
The harm to follow upon the postponement of treatment was not directly intended by the lawyer to be a result of his
deceit, though he did so intend the plaintiff's damage in respect of the cause of action.3 Yet this danger of greater suffering
and disability which menaces the laborer is
objectively related to the lawyer's wrongful
deceit, not as a merely indirect or accidental effect thereof, but as a direct effect of
the lawyer's fraud. 4 That a man afflicted
with a disease will not seek treatment for
it is a direct and natural result of the act
by which another deceives the patient, making him believe not only that he has not
such a disease, but also that conditions for
which he might seek independent diagnosis
and treatment are beyond the diagnostic
and remedial powers of medical specialists.
Although this pending result of his fraud

a Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality,
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 41, 48 (Winter 1958).

4 See Canon 31, supra note 2.
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was not the purpose intended by the lawyer
when he deceived the laborer, and although
he has recognized this danger only now, a
month after his deceit achieved the objective he did intend, still justice obliges the
lawyer to prevent this evil result from being
actualized as a direct effect of his wrongful
conduct.
The distinction between the direct and
the indirect effects of an act is so important
a factor in our moral evaluation that we
must do our best to clarify this distinction.
Take it that A, B and C are amateur
yachtsmen and strangers to each other. B
and C are on trial runs, and therefore have
experts aboard. As A overtakes B, he hails,
"I think my rudder is out of line, and I feel
something else is wrong." B answers, "I
have a marine architect and engineer here.
Sail past, and I'll have them look you
over." The experts tell B that A has a list
which, to their practiced eyes, is a certain
indication that A's keel is nearly detached.
They declare that if A were aware of the
condition of his keel he would realize that
he must soon shorten sail or run certain
risk of capsizing. B has no purpose to harm
A, but he does not want the trouble of taking A in tow, which he would be expected
to do if A had to shorten sail in the sea
now running. The experts also tell B that
A's rudder is out of line, and B calls to A,
"You're right, your rudder is out of line."
Then A sails past C, whose experts remark
to C upon all the facts and indications
which B's experts have noted. A hails C,
as he had hailed B, but C, lying, answers,
"I can't hear you."
A's present peril is an effect of both lies
-he is in danger because he does not know
the condition of his keel, and both lies are

effective to keep him in igorance of that
fact. But B's lie is calculated, in and of
itself, to stop further investigation or inquiry through which A may discover his
peril, while C's lie has not that inherent
tendency. If, for example, A finds an opportunity to make inquiry of a Coast Guard
cutter which is running a parallel course,
though not so close to A as the other
yachts, C's lie has no tendency, de se, to
make A pass up that opportunity; but in
B's lie that tendency is inherent. A's peril
is a direct effect of B's lie, but it is only an
indirect effect of C's.
The determination that the laborer's peril
is a direct, rather than an indirect, effect
of the lawyer's lie will morally qualify the
lawyer's moral obligation to relieve the
peril. Though the parties be strangers one
to another, both justice and charity oblige
the one to prevent the occurrence of damages to the other as a direct effect of his
conduct. In the absence of any special relation which imposes other duties, charity
alone requires one to prevent another's
harm which is only an indirect effect of
one's act or omission. As B, if he has now
means of signaling A, is bound by charity
and by justice to warn A, so is the lawyer
bound to relieve the laborer's peril; the
lawyer's obligation is not one of charity
only, as is the obligation of C to warn A.
The chief practicial import of the conclusion that the lawyer here is bound by
both justice and charity, rather than by
charity only, will appear when we discuss
the causes which may excuse performance
of this duty. The principles which excuse
performance of charitable obligations are
much less strict and rigorous than those
which permit postponement of perform-
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ance of a duty imposed by the virtue of
justice.
Causes Which May Excuse
Postponement of a Performance
Due in Justice
No cause will excuse performance of a
negative duty imposed by justice. If justice
forbids an act, the act is evil, and evil may
never be done as a means of accomplishing
a good purpose.
Performance of an affirmative duty of
justice may be postponed, even indefinitely,
without moral guilt, provided that the performance is excused and continues to be
excused by physical or moral impossibility. 5
Physical impossibility would excuse the
yachtsman B, for example, if the weather
prevented him from overtaking A and from
sending A any effective signal. But unless
the laborer has disappeared without leaving a trace, there is no imaginable physical
impossibility which will excuse the lawyer's
duty to make the laborer aware of his infirmity. If the lawyer is penniless and he
cannot get his client to meet the entire
cost, he is excused from his duty to compensate the laborer's financial loss in respect of his cause of action.
Moral impossibility of performance
raises more difficult problems. Consideration of the order of goods or values in
which the person wronged and the wrongdoer will suffer and comparison of the

5 Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteria of Morality,
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 41, 49 (Winter 1948).
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quanta of the respective detriments are
helpful indications.
When we compare the plaintiff's financial loss in the fraudulent release with the
money cost of the lawyer's restitution, it is
probable that a great disparity will excuse
the lawyer-say his cost would be double
the fair value of the other's loss, and that
this loss had not reduced the plaintiff to
penury. If the parties suffer in different
orders of value, the lawyer may be excused
by a very serious loss in a higher order,
though the relative quantum of his loss is
not clearly greater than the plaintiff's. A
certainty or a great probability that disbarment would be involved might well excuse
postponement of this duty. A loss of reputation incidental to the revelation of his
fraud would seem to have been a risk assumed in the act of willful fraud, and would
not excuse-unless the disgrace were so
great and so nearly certain that one could
say it will totally ruin the lawyer's career.
To excuse performance of the duty to
save the laborer from his peril of greatly
increased and prolonged suffering and disability, no money loss, as such, would seem
to suffice. But a great detriment in the same
order of values or in a higher order might
excuse postponement of the duty to make
the laborer aware of his perilous state of
health. That peril respects a detriment in
the order of the "goods of life." Thus, if
the lawyer grievously risks lifelong penury,
his loss is not in the order of property only,
but passes over into the order of "goods of
life." A prison term, considerably longer
than the added period of illness which menaces the laborer, would be a detriment in
the same order as the laborer's, and might
be considered more grave.

SOLUTION OF THE DISCLOSURE PROBLEM

We are not given a statement of the lawyer's financial condition, nor an assessment
of the value of the claim of which the
plaintiff was defrauded. But it is clear that
the duties to save the laborer from physical
peril and to re-establish his right to sue on
his claim can be accomplished by the lawyer without immediate expenditure. Ultimately, of course, the lawyer will have to
make contribution to the satisfaction of a
new release or of a judgment, but it is only
a practical certainty of an exorbitantly unjust demand or award, or of actual penury,
which will excuse the lawyer from incurring that risk.
It does not appear that the lawyer risks
prison or disbarment or a crushing disgrace, if he approaches his task with the
aid of the court. The court should be willing to help the parties make a fair composition of the matter. The lawyer should
fully state the facts to the court, except
that, with unmistakable clarity, he should
indicate that he is making no admission
in respect of the intent or advertence with
which he acted. The lawyer may say that
reflection upon the consequences of his
conduct has urged upon him a conscientious duty to appeal to the good office of
the court.6 He should declare his readiness
to meet from his own resources any expense in excess of the sum his client should
have had to pay, absent the fraud, for a
release which included the cause of action
for brain injury, or for satisfaction of a
reasonable judgment upon that claim.

6 Compare Opinion 673, OPINIONS OF THE COMMrrTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics OF THE AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYER'S AssoCIATION 389 (1956).

Conflicting Obligations
When one is under a moral duty which
forbids a performance imposed by another
moral obligation, the performance is morally impossible and is therefore excused.
Do the obligations of the defendant's attorney, to his client and to his profession,
excuse his performance of the duties to
make restitution for the harm the laborer
has suffered and to save the laborer from
future peril?
Since the client is the beneficiary of the
professional duties here in issue, this problem does not arise if the client consents to
the lawyer's performance of his obligations
to the laborer. If the client, not wishing to
incur the trouble and expense incidental to
reopening the laborer's release, refuses this
consent, the lawyer must consider whether
his obligations to his client excuse him
from the duties he owes the plaintiff laborer.
Does the defendant have a strict right
to safeguard his present position? It seems
he has not. Even if the defendant has had
no moral responsibility in the fraudulent
conduct of his attorney, he now knows that
the position he enjoys, in having a practical immunity from suit by the laborer,
is an advantage to which he is not morally
entitled, for it was procured unjustly. He
is, therefore, subject to the moral duties of
a "possessor bonae fidei rei alienae"from the moment he discovers that he is
withholding a right from its true owner, he
is bound to restore that right. Consequently, he acts unjustly, from a moral
point of view, if he declines to make restitution to the laborer and forbids his attorney to do so.
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Yet are not the duties of confidence and
fidelity, imposed upon the attorney by law,
made for the common good, so that the
immorality of an individual client's position does not absolve the attorney of these
obligations? Clearly, this question must be
answered affirmatively, but the answer is
subject to distinct limitations. The duty of
confidence is not unqualified. Our courts
have held that an attorney may not claim
privilege as to communications made to
him in connection with his client's suit, not
made by the client himself, but by a person whom the attorney interviewed as a
prospective witness for the client's cause. 7
Under that rule, the neurologist's report in
this case is not privileged. The decision of
Judge Morrow in In re Boone 8 has become
a classic description of the attorney's duties
of confidence and fidelity to his client. Yet
that opinion carefully states some of the
limits of these duties: "He is not allowed
to divulge information and secrets imparted to him by his client or acquired during their professional relation, except, perhaps, in very rare circumstances. . .. "
"... [D]isclosures made by a client to his
attorney involving crimes mala in se or, as
in the matter at hand, the prostitution of
justice itself, are not protected by the privilege ....-10 "The obligation of an attorney
...was never understood or intended to
justify an attorney in misleading the court
itself. . . ."I

See Bergmann v. Manes, 141 App. Div. 102,
125 N.Y. Supp. 973 (2d Dep't 1910).
8 83 Fed. 944 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
7

9 In re Boone, 83 Fed. 944, 953
1897).
30 id. at 960.
11 Id. at 962.
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It does not appear that, either because
the lawyer himself has practiced the fraud,
or because the deceit was practiced in pretrial, the Canon on Discovery of Imposition and Deception 12 should not be construed to cover the problem case here.
"When a lawyer discovers that some fraud
or deception has been practiced, which has
unjustly imposed upon the Court or a
party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at
first by advising his client, and if his client
refuses to forgeo the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform
the injured person or his counsel, so that
they may take appropriate steps."
Causes Which Discharge an Obligation
Imposed by Charity Only
Since the virtue of justice imposes the
duties of the lawyer in respect of the plaintiff's accrued damages and of the peril to
the laborer's health, the more lenient principle which excuses obligations of charity
alone has no application in this case. If it
were shown, however, that there was lacking some element essentially necessary to
establish either of these duties as flowing
from justice, then that duty would stand as
an obligation of charity only, and its performance might be excused by operation of
the more lenient principle.
There would be such lack, for example,
if closer and more competent analysis of
the facts showed: that the concealment of
the neurologist's report was passive only,
and not unjust; that at least one of the
tests for the duty to make reparation for

(N.D. Cal.
12

Canon 41,

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CAN-

ONS OF PROFESSIONAL

ETmics.
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damages was not met; that the laborer's
condition will not be ameliorated by early
treatment; that he will get early treatment
though the lawyer should not warn him;
or that, though the peril is real, it is only
13
an indirect effect of the lawyer's fraud.

come to the laborer if, while his diseased
condition worsens, the deception which the
attorney practiced continues to prevent the
laborer from seeking a proper medical
diagnosis.

The obligation affected by such a correction of the findings offered by the present
writer would be a duty of charity and not
of justice. Charity obliges us to save others
from harm, whatever be the evil which
affects or threatens them, and especially if
harm is a result of our own conduct,
though only indirect. Duties of charity are
subject to two limitations. Charity never
obliges at the cost of equal harm or peril to
one's self. And a truly serious harm or
peril (though it be not so grave as the
neighbor's, or affect an inferior order) will
excuse one from aiding his neighbor in any
but the most serious necessities.

The Defense Attorney's Duty to Make
Restitution for Damages
Unjustly Inflicted

If either of the duties which the defendant's attorney owes to the plaintiff were
imposed by charity only, performance
thereof might be excused by a serious risk
of notable loss to the lawyer, in money or
in reputation.
14
In the earlier discussion of this case,
it was determined that the defendant's attorney incurred two specific moral obligations to the plaintiff laborer. He is bound
to make restitution for the loss which the
plaintiff suffered through the attorney's
fraud in the settlement negotiations. He is
obliged also to prevent the harm which will

13

All duties to make restitution for damages one causes unjustly have three essential premises. We have shown 15 that each
of these premises was established by the
facts of the case in their reference to the
attorney's defrauding the laborer of a significant factor in his cause of action.
The attorney's active concealment of the
neurologist's report in negotiating the settlement was objectively unjust, for it violated the plaintiff's strict right to have a
compensation proportioned to every aspect
of the claim which he released. This right
arose immediately from the defendant attorney's volunteered representation that
his client's offer of compensation was proportioned to all aspects of the claim known
to him and his client. The report was concealed to induce execution of a release of
the laborer's entire claim, while the consideration actually given for the release represented compensation for only that part of
the plaintiff's claim which related to the
shoulder injury.
Secondly, the attorney's act efficaciously
caused the plaintiff to lose all opportunity
to exercise his right to sue on the head

Cf. Cahill, Some General Criteriaof Morality,

4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 41, 50-52 (Winter 1958).

14 Cahill, Solution of the Disclosure Problem,
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 254 (Summer 1958).

15

Id. at 255; see PRJMMER, HANDBOOK OF
§§ 270, 271 (Nolan ed. 1957).
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injury aspect of his claim. Though the release may not be legally effective to bar
suit claiming damages for the head injury,
the existence of the general release, in the
circumstances of the case, prevents the
plaintiff and his attorneys from realizing
and exercising this right.
Finally, we determined that the attorney
acted with theological fault 16 when he concealed the neurologist's report, for he then
well knew that his act was: (1) morally
wrong, (2) violative of the plaintiff's strict
right created by the offer of settlement, and
(3) potentially efficacious to bar (in fact,
if not in law) any suit claiming damages
for the head injury. Therefore he acted
with theological fault.
Has the Defendant a Similar Duty
of Restitution?
Now we are asked whether the defendant himself has a similar obligation to
make restitution for the loss inflicted upon
the laborer in the dishonest negotiation.
The facts given in the statement are insufficient to base a judgment that the defendant knew what his lawyer meant to do, or
that he became aware of the situation before the settlement was concluded, or, consequently, that he participated in the wrong
with theological fault, knowing his lawyer's act to be immoral, unjust, and efficacious of harm to the laborer.
Yet it is obvious that if the defendant
participated, with theological fault, in his
attorney's immoral and injurious conduct,

16 See Cahill, Solution of the Disclosure Problem, supra note 1, at 255.
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he has a duty of restitution exactly parallel
to his lawyer's duty. Provided only that he
knew the situation at the time his lawyer
acted, there is no doubt that he must have
participated in the lawyer's act, either by
directing the lawyer to act as he did, or by
advising that course of conduct, or by at
least consenting that his lawyer should so
act. Given that the client was aware of the
situation, the lawyer could not have done
what he did without the client's mandate
or consent, and the client may have advised the lawyer to proceed as he did. Jf
the client participated in any of these ways
in his lawyer's act, he was a positive cooperator in that act and, as such, he is
bound with the lawyer to make restitution
to the plaintiff. In such a case, there is no
way of assessing to the co-operators portions or shares of the harm done, for they
did not harm the plaintiff in different ways
or by distinct acts. Each is bound to re7
store the whole harm.'
Yet there is an order of priority between
the obligations of such co-operators. In the
supposition advanced above the defendant's obligation would be prior to the lawyer's. Moralists set out this order of cooperators in respect of their several duties
of entire restitution: (1) the person now
enjoying the benefit of the wrong, (2) the
one who commanded that the wrong be
done, (3) the executor of the wrong, (4)
the other positive co-operators, who counselled the wrong or consented to it, or
commended or defended it, or had a part
in the wrongful act itself, (5) negative cooperators, who, in violation of a duty,
failed to prevent the wrong or concealed

17 PRiOMMER, Op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 309, 310.
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it.' s Certainly the defendant is the beneficiary of the laborer's loss. In that character, and also as mandator of the wrong
(if such he were in fact), the defendant's
duty is prior to his lawyer's. Thus his
lawyer may delay making restitution until
he is reasonably sure that his client will
not do so.
Even if the defendant did not participate
in his lawyer's misconduct, having been,
perhaps, at that time unaware of how the
negotiations were being conducted, he may
still have a duty of restitution. He may
have come into possession of his immunity
from suit by the laborer without knowing
that the immunity was unjustly procured.
But he may since have come to realize
that it was procured unjustly. In such case,
he has been a "possessor in good faith of
another's goods," and his duty to make
restitution arises when he comes to know
that he enjoys this immunity contrary to
the laborer's rights.' 9 Here, as in the situation supposed above, his duty to make
restitution is prior to his lawyer's duty.
Have the Plaintiff's Attorneys a
Similar Duty of Restitution?

The attorneys for the plaintiff did not
participate in the active concealment of the
neurological report. They might be classed
as negative co-operators in the wrongdoing
of the defendant's attorney if they knew or
had any reason to know that he was concealing the report, but none of the given
facts indicates that they had such knowledge. Therefore, if they have a duty to

18 Id. §§ 273, 310.
19 Id. § 306.

make restitution to their client analogous
to the duty falling upon the attorney for
the defendant, their duty of restitution
must have a different foundation.
The plaintiff's attorneys could have procured an independent and adequate medical examination of their client, or they
could have assured themselves that the
examination made by the defendant's doctors was adequate and that its full findings
were made known to them, their client, and
the court. Their omission to do either of
these things violated the strict rights of
their client.
An attorney who engages to represent a
client claiming damages undertakes that
the claim is at least arguable and that he
will advance that claim with skill and zeal.
None of the elements of a cause of action
for bodily injuries can be established,
either in negotiation or on trial, unless the
character and scope of the plaintiff's injuries be known. To know these things is
the first of all the duties of the plaintiff's
attorney. Without this knowledge, he cannot decide whether the client has a cause of
action, whether that action will likely succeed on trial, or what may be a proper
monetary demand on trial or in negotiation
for a release. Thus, without knowing well
the character of the bodily injuries, the
attorney cannot justly advise his client to
press or to abandon the claim, much less
can he assume to negotiate or to sue the
claim.
This duty of knowledge does not, of
course, require the attorney to press his inquiries to the theoretically possible ultimate. It binds him to use means of inquiry
which are reasonably proportioned to the
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character of the injuries, the client's resources, and the opportunities which the
circumstances of the case afford. If, when
a cause is presented to him, an attorney
finds himself unable to pursue the lines of
inquiry thus indicated, he is morally bound
to decline the employment. He is, of
course, unable to pursue the necessary inquiry if he does not know and has not opportunity to learn the practical means of
inquiry appropriate to the type of case
presented.
Here the client alleged a head injury;
the hospital record indicated scalp sutures,
and the patient complained of headaches
after discharge from the hospital. In the
face of these facts, the attorneys' most elementary duty imposed the necessary task
of securing a good medical examination
specifically directed to the complaint of
head injury. If the client, being a laborer,
could not pay for such an examination, the
attorney might explore the facilities of public agencies. If the defendant offered an
examination, as he did in the case presented, the plaintiff's attorneys had a clear
duty to assure themselves that in the examination adequate and competent attention should be given to the head complaint,
and that the full and exact results of the
examination should be available to them.
It is, then, perfectly clear that this laborer's
attorneys breached their duty to him, and
violated his strict right.
That the laborer suffered real loss as a
result of that breach seems equally clear
from the statement of facts: "The defendant paid a sum which amply compensated
the plaintiff for his shoulder injury, and the
plaintiff gave a general release as to personal injuries, 'whether developed or un-
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developed, resulting or to result' from the
accident." In our earlier discussion, it was
shown that the laborer's Parkinsonism
would serve as sufficient matter for a statement of a cause of action. An assertion of
a physical ill which reasonably may be related to an impact for which the defendant
is or may be legally responsible states a
cause of action for damages. With nothing
more, the laborer had a moral right, created by the law, to come into court with
evidence of the facts and argument on the
question of law. That right he unknowingly
abandoned, at least for practical purposes,
because his lawyers advised him to sign the
general release without knowledge of the
facts that he had Parkinsonism and that
his diseased condition may be causally related to the head impact.
It may be said that while the plaintiff's
attorneys' undutiful omissions were, in
themselves, sufficient to cause his harm if
the settlement had been reached upon their
statement of the nature of his injuries, yet
the deception practiced by the defendant's
attorney intervened and became the immediate cause of that harm. The proper
answer to this difficulty is the principle
"causa causae est causa causatae" (the
cause of a cause is the cause of that cause's
effect). Their undutiful omissions made it
possible for the fraud to harm their client,
and the prevention of any harm which
might come to him by such fraud was an
integral part of their duty to him. If the
facts showed that they had taken any step
to control the conduct and reports of the
examination made by the defendant's doctors, we would have to examine two further questions: "Was the step taken a
reasonably adequate performance of their
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duty?" and "If not, was it such part performance as might require the duty of restitution to be pro-rated between them
and the defendant and his attorney?" Since
they failed completely in their duty to prevent fraud, their omissions can be taken
as fully efficacious of their client's harm. If
they had theological fault in making these
omissions, they are as fully bound to make
restitution as are the defendant and his attorney. The defendant, as presently enjoying the fruits of the harm inflicted, would
have the prior duty, but it would seem that
the plaintiff's attorneys cannot claim that
the duty of the defendant's attorney is prior
to their own.
Now we come to the third premise
necessary to establish that the duty of
restitution has been incurred by the plaintiff's attorneys. It seems impossible to judge
whether or not they acted with theological
fault, realizing that their omissions were
immoral and unjust acts, endowed with a
probable potential to harm their client in
the way he has been harmed in fact. This
difficulty arises, of course, because the case
is stated upon information given by the defendant's attorney only. For this reason, we
know nothing of the actual state of mind in
which the plaintiff's attorneys made their
undutiful omissions. We could speculate
that men of average intelligence must have
acted in a guilty manner, either at the time
when they were dealing with this case, or
at an earlier time when they settled their
policy for dealing with such cases. It is not
too much to suppose that no man with a
modicum of legal training could be totally
unaware of the duty to inform himself of
the nature of his client's cause of action.
And it is not an attribution of the ultimate

in perspicacity to say that he must have
realized that to omit proper medical examination and report in personal injury actions must result in some clients' giving
releases not adequately compensated. But
to pursue the discussion upon such generalities would not be very fruitful.

The Defense Attorney's Duty to Warn
the Laborer of His Present Peril
One is bound by the virtue of justice to
prevent or to stop a direct, though unintended, effect of his unjust act if that effect
is now bringing or threatening to bring
harm to another. In our prior discussion of
this case, it was established that the attorney for the defendant acted unjustly
when he made the laborer believe he has
no diseased condition symptomatized by
the headaches he has suffered since leaving
the hospital. 20 This belief, as was seen,
practically prevents the laborer from getting a diagnosis of his Parkinsonism. If
the disease continues long to develop without diagnosis and treatment, its effects will
be very much more painful and disabling.
Therefore, it is concluded, the defendant's
attorney is bound in justice to let the laborer have such knowledge of his condition as will offset the present peril created
directly by the lawyer's wrongful deception.
It does not seem that the lawyer is in
such ignorance of this duty that he may be
subjectively guiltless if he fails to perform
it. A month after the settlement was made,
this lawyer realized that his past conduct

20

Cahill, Solution of the Disclosure Problem, 4
254, 257-58 (Summer 1958).

CATHOLIC LAWYER

17
may have imposed upon him some present
duty to aid the laborer. It was this realization which caused him to inquire whether
such duty exists and what its scope may be.
He has had a reasoned answer. Unless he
can find flaws in the reasoning which warrant him to reject the answer as incorrect
or inconclusive, he will act immorally if he
does not act according to the counsel given.
Has the Defendant a Similar Duty
to Warn the Laborer?
If the defendant was a positive co-operator, as this term was explained above, in
the deception practised by his attorney,
then the laborer's peril is a direct effect of
an unjust act of the defendant. In such
case, there is no doubt that the defendant's
duty to warn the laborer is the same as his
attorney's duty.
An act of the defendant, co-operating in
his lawyer's fraud by mandate, counsel, or
consent, would be an act efficaciously causative of the laborer's deception and his
present danger. That such act's causation was not immediate, having operated
through the lawyer, would not make the
causation indirect. The causation is direct
because the mandate, advice or consent
had, in its circumstances, an inherent tendency to produce the deception and the
peril.
Even if the defendant was not a guilty
co-operator, because he was ignorant of
his lawyer's tactics in the negotiation, the
defendant has now a duty not to increase
the laborer's peril. He would increase it if,
in fulfilling his duty to make restitution
in respect of the laborer's claim, he directly confirmed the laborer's persuasion
that the headaches are not symptomatic of
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any disease for which he can have effective
diagnosis and treatment. Justice forbids
him to permit his restitution to have that
effect. Charity imposes the duty to use
such methods of making restitution as will
not confirm the laborer's dangerous persuasion even indirectly. Charity also imposes the duty affirmatively to warn the
laborer, if the defendant now knows of the
laborer's peril, even though the defendant,
because he knew not the character of his
lawyer's tactics, was not a guilty co-operator therein.
Have the Plaintiff's Attorneys a Similar
Duty to Warn the Laborer?
Whether or not they acted with theological fault when they caused the laborer's
mistaken estimate of his present condition,
they are bound by justice to warn him of
his danger, provided, of course, that they
are now aware of the evil which threatens
him.
The duty which justice imposes, to prevent or to stop the unjustly harmful direct
effects of one's conduct, does not, as does
the duty of restitution, postulate that the
conduct was done with theological fault.
The laborer's peril is a direct effect of his
attorneys' omissions because their failure
to deal skillfully and zealously with their
client's claim had, in the circumstances, an
inherent tendency to harm their client unjustly by putting him in this peril of greater
suffering and disability.
The Obligations of the Wrongdoers
Inter Sese
Because the defendant himself and the
attorneys for the plaintiff made no contri-
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bution to the statement upon which we
have attempted to resolve the case, we cannot say confidently that these three men incurred subjective guilt or theological fault
in the acts by which the plaintiff was unjustly led to release the head injury aspect
of his cause of action and defrauded of
compensation therefore. Since theological
fault is a necessary premise of the duty of
restitution for harm, we can say that these
men have this duty only by supposing,
without clear support from the statement
of the case, that when they caused this
harm they acted with knowledge that their
acts or omissions were immoral, unjust to
the plaintiff, and capable of causing him
the harm which has eventuated. With respect to the plaintiff's attorneys, we make
a further supposition: that each of them
was at least a positive co-operator with the
member or members of their firm who
handled the plaintiff's case.
Upon these hypotheses, all three attorneys and the defendant are severally
bound in justice to make entire restitution
for the plaintiff's harm. The priority of obligation is clearly against the defendant, as
present possessor of the fruits of injustice.
None of these men has a duty of justice

to contribute to the one who actually
makes restitution.
Upon the alternative hypothesis that the
defendant was not a theologically guilty
co-operator in the injustice, but that he
now knows that he has been a "possessor
in good faith of the goods of another"
by reason of the immunity he enjoys as
against suit by the plaintiff, the defendant
is still bound to make restitution, and his
obligation is prior to the obligations of the
attorneys. This alternative does not change
the conclusion that none of the four has
a duty of contribution to any other wrongdoer.
Supposing that all four men know now
of the laborer's peril, each is bound by
justice to warn him of it. There is no
priority here, and no right of contribution
for damages incurred by one who gives the
warning.
Finally, each of these duties is subject
to postponement for cause, that is, by
reason of physical or moral impossibility.
Those causes were explained in the initial
21
discussion.
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